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Abstract We consider the use of interventions for resolving a problem of
unidentified statistical models. The leading examples are from latent variable
modelling, an influential statistical tool in the social sciences. We first explain the
problem of statistical identifiability and contrast it with the identifiability of causal
models. We then draw a parallel between the latent variable models and Bayesian
networks with hidden nodes. This allows us to clarify the use of interventions for
dealing with unidentified statistical models. We end by discussing the philosophical
and methodological import of our result.
Keywords Interventions  Statistical inference  Identifiability  Latent
variable modelling
1 Introduction
A statistical model may include hypotheses that have identical likelihood functions
over the entire sample space. This is the problem of statistical identifiability: several
statistical hypotheses fit the data equally well, hence we cannot identify the best one
by data alone. So-called unidentified models exhibit a form of underdetermination,
though not the radical form that often features in arguments against scientific
realism. The standard response to underdetermination is to look for theoretical
criteria, such as simplicity or explanatory force, that help us choose between the
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rivals. In factor analytic models, for example, one might use criteria pertaining to
the variation among the estimations of the statistical parameters to force a unique
solution of the estimation of factor loadings.
In this paper we investigate a particular solution to the problem of statistical
identifiability in the context of causal modelling. Given the context, let us stress that
the statistical identifiability problem must not be confused with the problem of
identifying so-called causal effects (cf. Pearl 2000, chapter 3). The latter concerns
the determination of how a system responds to interventions, i.e., determining
causal structure. Statistical identifiability is different because it does not involve
uncertainty about causal structure. Instead it concerns the determination of
statistical parameters within a model whose causal structure is fully specified. It
occurs when the statistical hypotheses under consideration say the very same things
about what observations to expect, i.e., they have exactly the same likelihood
functions and thus perform equally well on the observed data.
That said, the solution that we investigate does rely on the causal interpretation of
the statistical models. In fact, the solution assumes that certain aspects of the causal
model are known, and therefore that the problem of causal identifiability has to
some extent been resolved. It trades on the fact that the otherwise identical
statistical hypotheses need not be equivalent in a causal sense. We can consider
specific changes to the setup of the study, i.e., specific interventions, such that the
hypotheses get different likelihood functions over the additional results. The
hypotheses are then told apart by their differing causal content. For this solution to
work, we need to presume that we have already determined how the system behaves
after intervention.
Our solution to statistical identifiability conveys two messages. The first is
philosophical: we want to bring to the fore an important and, to our mind,
undervalued aspect of scientific confirmation, namely the use of intervention data.
We believe that insights from the philosophy of experiment (e.g. Hacking 1980;
Gooding 1990) can come to fruition in confirmation theory and we hope to make a
modest start with that. A further message is methodological: we hope to contribute
to a better understanding of the benefits of interventions and stimulate the uptake of
statistical tools for modeling interventions in social science. Despite the availability
of statistical theories and methodological tools for exploiting intervention data,
scientists are often not aware of their potential. Moreover, insofar as there is
awareness, this mostly concentrates on the identification of causal effects or the use
of intervention data for determining causal structure (e.g., Spirtes et al. 2001;
Eberhardt et al. 2010; Hyttinen et al. 2012; Silva and Scheines 2003). This paper
suggests a different use of intervention data.
We present our argument in the setting of latent variable modelling, a statistical
modelling tool from the social sciences that remains understudied in the philosophy
of science, with one or two exceptions. Johnson (2014) offers a wonderful overview
of the philosophical import of factor analysis in connection to the problem of
underdetermination. Interestingly, although our papers target different problems and
were written independently, they reach similar general conclusions. Factor analysis
makes another appearance in Haig (2005) and Schurz (2008), namely as a model for
abductive inference, and thus as a tool for generating and selecting theory. In this
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paper we take a different perspective. We employ exploratory factor analysis as an
illustration of a more general problem concerning statistical unidentifiability, and
we focus on the role of interventions in resolving it.
The paper is set up in the following way. In Sect. 2 we introduce statistical
identifiability abstractly and in Sect. 3 we make these problems concrete for latent
class analysis and factor analysis. We show in Sect. 4 that latent variable modelling
is for our purposes identical to estimating parameters in a Bayesian network with
hidden nodes. Just as is the case with causal Bayesian networks, data obtained after
intervention can be used to identify features of models in factor analysis. In
particular, we argue in Sect. 4.3 that intervention data can, under the right
conditions, be used to resolve problems of statistical identifiability. In Sect. 5,
finally, we briefly suggest how this model for intervention may prove useful to the
philosophy of science in general.
We see the topic of this paper as an opportunity for a fruitful interaction between
philosophers of science and social science methodologists. Our own expertise is first
and foremost in the former: we mostly consider identifiability problems and causal
models from an abstract point of view. Social science methodologists, on the other
hand, regularly encounter such problems in practice. We believe that insights from
the applications can shed valuable light on the theoretical problem. Similarly, we
hope that our more theoretical insights will be of use to the methodologists.
2 Unidentified Models
In what follows we characterize the problem of unidentified statistical models, and
make it precise for latent class analysis (LCA), a well-known statistical technique
in, e.g., psychometrics. LCA is a close cousin to factor analysis (FA). LCA and FA
are both routinely used to interpret psychological test data, and working
psychologists face the problem that the data often do not allow for a complete
determination of the underlying classes or factors. This presents psychological
science with its own version of the philosophical problem of underdetermination (cf.
Johnson 2014).
2.1 Identifiability in Statistics
Here we illustrate the concept of statistical identifiability using some toy examples.
A more realistic setting will be introduced in Sect. 2.2.
Consider a simple statistical problem, in which we estimate the chances of events
in independent and identical trials, e.g., results in psychological tests. An
observation at time t is denoted by the assignment of a value to a binary variable
Qt, with possible values failing and passing the test. We denote a sequence of t
observations or test results by means of the variable St. For example, if
St ¼ 010. . .1, then Q1 ¼ 0, Q2 ¼ 1, and so on. The hypothesis Hh says that the
chance of observing Qtþ1 ¼ 1 is h irrespective of which sequence of outcomes St
precedes it.
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PðQtþ1 ¼ 1jHh; StÞ ¼ h ð1Þ
for every St and for each trial Qtþ1, an expression involving what is often called the
likelihood function of Hh.
1
The chance h of the event Qtþ1 ¼ 1 may be any value in [0, 1], so we have a
whole continuum of hypotheses Hh gathered in what we call a statistical model,
denoted H. On the basis of some sequence of events St, we can provide an estimate
of h. We can do so either by defining a prior PðHhÞ and then computing a posterior
by Bayesian conditioning, or by defining an estimator function over the event space,







The above estimation problem is completely unproblematic. The observations have
a different bearing on each of the hypotheses in the model, i.e. each member of the
set of hypotheses. If there is indeed a true hypothesis in the set, then according to
well-known convergence theorems (cf. Earman 1992, pp. 141–149), the probability
of assigning a probability 1 to this hypothesis will tend to one. In the limit, we can
therefore almost always, in the technical sense of this expression, tell the statistical
hypotheses apart.2
This situation is different if we take a slightly different set of statistical
hypotheses Gn, characterized as follows:
PðQtþ1 ¼ 1jGn; StÞ ¼ n
2
; n 2 ½ 1; 1:
This set of hypotheses covers the same set of possibilities, only they are doubly
labelled. The hypotheses Gn and Gn are indistinguishable, because they both assign
exactly the same probability to all the observations: PðQtþ1 ¼ 1jGn \ StÞ ¼
PðQtþ1 ¼ 1jGn \ StÞ. In such a case, we speak of an unidentifiable model. Notice
that this situation is much like having a single equation with two unknowns, for
instance xþ y ¼ 1 with x; y 2 ½0; 1. We cannot find a unique solution for x and y,
rather we have a whole collection of solutions. To force uniqueness, we need a
further equation, e.g., x y ¼ 0.
Unidentifiable models are in a sense underdetermined by the observations.
Importantly, this kind of statistical underdetermination is not of the kind most feared
by scientific realists, because there may well be experiments or additional
observations that would allow one to disentangle the statistical hypotheses. This
paper shows how additional experiments can achieve this.
1 We follow the Bayesian idea that hypotheses Hh can serve as arguments of the probability function.
Further conventions are that equations, like Qtþ1 ¼ 1, can appear as arguments of a probability function,
and that expressions like St function as variables.
2 Any infinitely long sequence of results is in principle consistent with any of the hypotheses Hh, and in
that sense we are encountering an underdetermination problem in the estimation. However, here we will
not consider this type of identifiability.
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2.2 Latent Variable Models
The above example of statistical underdetermination is rather contrived: no reason is
given for distinguishing between the regions n[ 0 and n\0. However, there are
cases in which it makes perfect sense to introduce distinctions between hypotheses
that do not differ in their likelihood functions. This subsection is devoted to
presenting one of these cases, involving a so-called latent class model. The
exposition is partly borrowed from [omitted for purpose of blind review].
A latent variable model posits hidden, or latent, random variables on the basis of
an analysis of the correlational structure of observed, or manifest, random variables.
Examples are latent class models, which are discussed below, and factor models, in
which latent and manifest variables are continuous.3 Suppose that in some
experiment we observe (continuously or discretely varying) levels of fear F and
loathing L in a number of individuals who are represented via the index i, and we
find a positive correlation between these two variables,
PðFi; LiÞ[PðFiÞPðLiÞ:
One way of accounting for the correlation is by positing a statistical model over the
variables in which fear and loathing may be related directly.
We may feel that it is neither the loathing that instills fear in people, nor the fear
that invites loathing. Instead we might think that both feelings are correlated
because of a latent characteristic of the individuals, namely a depression from they
might be suffering. Conditional on the level of the depression, denoted Di, fear and
loathing might be uncorrelated:
PðDi;Fi; LiÞ ¼ PðDiÞPðFijDiÞPðLijDiÞ:
In the case in which all the variables vary continuously, we speak of a factor model.
We then say that the depression is the common factor to the observable, or manifest,
variables of fear and loathing, and the correlations between the depression variable
and the levels of fear and loathing we call the factor loadings.
Latent variable models come in several shapes and sizes, subdivided according to
whether the manifest and latent variables are categorical or continuous. In what
follows we discuss one of the most straightforward applications of such models, in
which both the manifest and latent variables are binary: latent class analysis. Our
reason is that we are making a conceptual point about interventions and
underdetermination. For this purpose the simplest format of factor analysis suffices.
To illustrate the latent class analysis, say that the depression is either present in
subject i, Di ¼ 1, or absent, Di ¼ 0, and similarly for fear and loathing. We assume
that over time the variables are independent and identically distributed. That is, for
i 6¼ i0 the variable Di is independent of Di0 , Fi0 and Li0 , and similarly for Fi and Li.
3 See Lawley and Maxwell (1971) for a classical statistical overview, Mulaik (1985) for a
philosophically-minded discussion, and Bartholomew and Knott (1999) for a very insightful introduction
from a Bayesian perspective. All these treatises introduce exploratory factor analysis as well as the much
less problematic statistical tool of confirmatory factor analysis. In this paper we concentrate on the
former, and simply call it factor analysis.
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Out of the possible probabilistic dependencies among Fi, Li and Di, we confine
ourselves to
PðFi ¼ 1jDi ¼ jÞ ¼ /j; ð2Þ
PðLi ¼ 1jDi ¼ jÞ ¼ kj; ð3Þ
for j ¼ 0; 1, a conditional version of the Bernoulli model of Eq. (1). Similarly for
the variable Di,
PðDi ¼ 1Þ ¼ d ð4Þ
The probability over the variables Di, Li and Fi is thus given by five Bernoulli
distributions, each characterized independently by a single chance parameter.
There may be experimental conditions in which the latent class that enhances or
reduces fear and loathing is observable, e.g., when the individuals all take a drug
E which reduces fear and loathing. But the depression variable D in our example is
latent: it cannot be observed directly. Although the causal or mechanistic
underpinning is unknown, we might nevertheless posit such a variable. Exploratory
factor analysis is a technique for arriving at such common factors in a systematic
way, in cases where the variables aer continuous. When given a set of correlations
among manifest variables, it produces a statistical model of latent common factors
that accounts for exactly these correlations.4
Perhaps unsurprisingly, latent variable models suffer from problems of identi-
fiability. They posit the theoretical structure of unobservable common causes, over
and above the observed correlations between observable variables. There will
generally be many latent variable models, and accordingly many different causal
structures, that fit the data. This is the problem of causal identifiability alluded to
earlier. However, even if all modeling choices have been made and if the list of
salient variables and their causal structure have been fixed, either by assumption or
by background knowledge, the problem of statistical underdetermination may
appear. In what follows we focus specifically on this restricted identification
problem.
2.3 Unidentifiability of Latent Variable Models
We now show that the model of Eqs. (2), (3) and (4) cannot be identified by the
data.
Focus on the dimensions of this model. We count 5 parameters, namely d, and /j
and kj for j ¼ 0; 1. On the other hand, we have the binary observations Fi and Li that
can be used to determine these parameters. But because we are using Bernoulli
hypotheses, only the observed relative frequencies of the possible combinations of
Fi and Li matter. And because we have 4 possible combinations of Fi and Li, whose
relative frequencies must add up to 1, we have 3 frequencies to determine the 5
4 See Bartholomew and Knott (1999) for a general introduction. Seeing that exploratory factor analysis
generates a structure that explains the observed correlations, it is rather natural that Haig (2005) and
Schurz (2008) present it as a formal model of abduction.
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parameters in the model. After having used the observations in the determination of
the parameters, therefore, we still have 2 degrees of freedom left. Hence the values
of the parameters in the model cannot be determined by the observation data
uniquely.
We can state this problem in more detail by looking at the likelihoods for the
observations of possible combinations of Fi and Li. We write h ¼ hd;/0;/1; k0; k1i.
For the likelihoods we write
PðFi ¼ 0; Li ¼ 1jHhÞ ¼ h01 ¼ dð1 /1Þk1 þ ð1 dÞð1 /0Þk0;
PðFi ¼ 1; Li ¼ 0jHhÞ ¼ h10 ¼ d/1ð1 k1Þ þ ð1 dÞ/0ð1 k0Þ;
PðFi ¼ 1; Li ¼ 1jHhÞ ¼ h11 ¼ d/1k1 þ ð1 dÞ/0k0;
ð5Þ
where we omitted mention of the other individuals Si1. The fourth likelihood,
PðFi ¼ 0; Li ¼ 0jHhÞ, can be derived from these expressions. The salient point is
that the system of equations resulting from filling in particular values for the above
likelihoods has infinitely many solutions in terms of the components of h: for any
value of the likelihoods, the space of solutions in h has 2 dimensions. The statistical
model is thus unidentifiable.
Let us briefly elaborate on the unidentifiability of the model. It means that the
likelihood function over the model does not have a unique maximum, and so that the
maximum-likelihood estimator does not point to a uniquely best hypothesis. In fact
there are infinitely many hypotheses compatible with the data. Say that we observe

















The likelihood PðStjHhÞ is maximal if the observed relative frequencies rjk match
the corresponding likelihoods hjk for all j and k:
hjk ¼ rjk: ð7Þ
But as said, there are infinitely many hypotheses Hh that have these particular values
for the likelihoods. Consequently, there is no unique hypothesis Hh that has max-
imal overall likelihood PðStjHhÞ.
For future reference we note that, by means of the likelihoods given in Eqs. (5),
we can determine a posterior probability for the hypotheses in the model, PðHhjStÞ.
And from the posterior distribution over the hypotheses we can generate the




h PðHhjStÞ dh: ð8Þ
Here h runs over ½0; 15 because the model is spanned by five independent chances.
Like the posterior, the estimations will suffer from the fact that the hypotheses
cannot be told apart: they will depend on the prior probability over the hypotheses.
Of course, this is usually the case in a Bayesian analysis. What is troublesome is that
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no amount of additional data can eliminate this dependence of the estimations on the
prior.
One reaction is to downplay the identifiability problem and say that it only
concerns the values of these abstract parameters and not the empirical conse-
quences. But because the estimations and expectations are not fully determined, the
nature of the latent variable underlying the manifest variables is not determined
either: it is not clear what causal role it plays. Different values for the parameters /j
and kj entail different systematic relations between depression, fear and loathing,
and ultimately this reflects back on our understanding of the posited notion of
depression itself.
3 Identifiability in Multivariate Linear Regression
The foregoing mostly concerned a latent class model, and such models are a lot
simpler than the models of factor analysis. In this section we argue that the problem
outlined above also shows up there. Furthermore, we will note that in factor analysis
there are actually two statistical identifiability problems. The first is made more
concrete in the first subsection. It presents an analogous problem to that described in
Sect. 2.3. The second type is briefly mentioned in the second subsection, mostly
because it has been hotly debated in psychological methodology, but also because
the present paper can offer a specific angle on it.
3.1 The Rotation Problem
In factor analysis the variables are not binary but continuous, the probabilistic
relations between the variables are linear regressions with normal errors, and the
latent variable is assumed to be governed by some continuous distribution as well.
In our example we may write Fi ¼ f for the event that the level of fear is f 2 R, and
similarly for depression Di ¼ d. Then the relation between Fi and Di, for example,
is
PðFi ¼ f jDi ¼ dÞ ¼ NðkFd; rFÞ ð9Þ
in which Nðkx; rÞ is a normal distribution over the values f of Fi. So the relation
between the variables Di and Fi is characterized by a richer family of distributions,
parameterized by a regression parameter kF and an error of size rF .
Despite these differences, the same kind of statistical identifiability problems
occur. Note that we can extend factor models like the one above to include any
number of common factors. However, once a model includes more than one
common factor, we find that the factor loadings are not completely determined.
Suppose, for example, that we analyze fear F, loathing L, and sleeplessness S in
terms of two common factors, one of them depression D, and the other the latent
variable C. Every individual is supposed to occupy a specific position in the C  D
surface. We might feel that a more natural way of understanding the surface of
latent variables is by labeling the states in this surface differently, for example by
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introducing variables A and B, both of which are linear combinations of C and
D. The factors in a model may be linearly combined or, in more spatial terms,
rotated to form any new pair of factors.5
The problem with this is that any rotation of factors, e.g., from fC;Dg to some
fA;Bg, will perform equally well on the estimation criterion, be it maximum
likelihood, generalized least squares, or similar, as long as we can adapt the factor
loadings and perhaps the correlations among the factors accordingly. This problem
is known as the problem of the rotation of factor scores. Neither the estimation
criteria—often maximum likelihood—nor Bayesian methods of incorporating the
data lead to a single best hypothesis in the factor model. The result is rather a
collection of such hypotheses that all fit optimally. That is, the factor model is not
identifiable.
A standard reaction to the rotation problem is to adopt further theoretical
criteria that can constrain the latent variables. For example, it may be considered
desirable to have maximal variation among the regression coefficients which,
intuitively, comes down to coupling each latent variable with a distinct subset of
manifest variables.6 The thing to note is that, from the point of view of statistics,
the choice for how to parameterize the space of latent variables is underdeter-
mined: we cannot decide between these parameterizations on the basis of the
observations alone.
In this paper we will not elaborate the mathematical details of identifiability
problems in these more complicated models. For present purposes, it suffices to use
the simpler factor model of Eqs. (2) to (4). The crucial characteristic in all of what
follows is that there are latent variables explaining the correlational structure among
the manifest variables, and that these structures are not fully determined by the
correlations among the manifest variables. Admittedly, this paper thereby falls short
of providing practical guidelines for dealing with the rotation problem, but we hope
that our suggestions about a means to remedy it are valuable in their own right.
3.2 Factor Score Indeterminacy
There is another problem with factor analysis that can be framed as an identifiability
problem, and that has received considerable attention within statistical psychology.7
Say that we have rotated the factors to meet the theoretical criterion of our
choice. Can we then reconstruct the latent variable itself, that is, can we provide a
labeling in which each individual, i.e., each assignment of values to the observable
variables, is assigned a determinate expected latent score? Sadly, the classical
statistical answer here is negative. We still have to deal with the so-called
indeterminacy of factor scores, meaning that there is a variety of ways in which we
5 This is a coordinate transformation in the space of latent variables, characterizing it in terms of different
bases.
6 This criterion is known as ‘‘varimax’’; see, e.g., Lawley and Maxwell (1971).
7 See Steiger (1979) for some historical context, Maraun (1996) for a philosophical evaluation,
McDonald (1974) for an excellent classical statistical discussion, and Bartholomew and Knott (1999) for
a Bayesian account of it.
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can organize the allocation of the individuals on the latent scores, all of them
perfectly consistent with the estimations.8
The type of unidentifiability presented by factor score indeterminacy depends on
what we take to be the statistical inference underlying factor analysis. In the context
of this paper, we take the factor analysis to specify a complete probability
assignment over the latent and manifest variables, including a prior probability over
the latent variables. As explained in Bartholomew and Knott (1999), factor score
indeterminacy is thereby eliminated, as long as there are sufficiently many manifest
variables that are related to the latent variables according to distributions of a
suitable, namely exponential, form. In this paper we will therefore ignore most of
the discussion on factor score indeterminacy.
There is one point at which the problem of factor score indeterminacy enters the
present discussion. We will show in what follows that intervention data can also be
used to choose among a class of priors. But as indicated, the problem of choosing a
prior probability is related to the problem of factor score indeterminacy. Therefore
the use of intervention data, which resolves the identifiability problem discussed
above, provides a new perspective on the problem of the indeterminacy of factor
scores as well. We will return to this idea in Sect. 5.2.
4 Interventions to Resolve Identifiability
In the foregoing we have shown that latent variable models suffer from
identifiability problems. We now explain these problems by revealing analogous
problems in the estimation of parameters in Bayesian networks. This leads us to
consider a specific solution, namely by means of intervention data. We first
introduce Bayesian networks in Sect. 4.1, then the notion of intervention in
Sect. 4.2, and finally its use in identifying latent variable models in Sect. 4.3. To the
best of our knowledge, this solution to the problem of statistical identifiability has
not yet been offered in the literature. The fact that the solution is not worked out in
full generality here is hopefully compensated for by the fact that it offers a new
insight into the use of intervention data.
4.1 Bayesian Networks and Factor Analysis
In general, a Bayesian network consists of a directed acyclic graph on a finite set of
variables fD;F; L;E. . .g together with the probability distributions of each variable
conditional on its parents in the graph, e.g., PðE j ParEÞ. The graph is related to the
probability distribution over the variables by an assumption known as the Markov
Condition: each variable is probabilistically independent of its non-descendants in
the graph, conditional on its parents, e.g., E ⊥ NonDescE | ParE; see Pearl
8 There are some restrictions to this allocation. For example, as worked out in Ellis and Junker (1997), if
we let the number of manifest variables increase and assume that there is a single latent variable that is
tail-measurable in terms of these manifest variables, then the factor scores are determined up to a
monotonic transformation.
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(2000). Under this assumption the network suffices to determine the joint
probability distribution over the variables, via the identity:
PðD;F; L; . . .Þ ¼ PðD j ParDÞ  PðF j ParFÞ  PðL j ParLÞ  . . . ð10Þ
The probability of any assignment of values to the variables on the left hand side of
this equation can be computed by filling in these valuations on the right hand side.
It is well-known that Bayesian networks and latent variable modeling are closely
related. In fact, the introduction of the latent class models for the binary variables
fF; L;Dg was already an introduction to a specific class of Bayesian networks. To
ease exposition, suppose that there are no inter-subject dependencies and that the
same probability assignment describes all subjects,
PðDi;Fi; LiÞ ¼ PðDi0 ;Fi0 ; Li0Þ; ð11Þ
so that we can omit the subscripts i. For each subject, the factor analysis determines
a probability function P(F, L, D) that satisfies a specific symmetry: conditional on
the latent depression D there is no correlation between the manifest fear F and
loathing L,
PðD;F; LÞ ¼ PðDÞPðFjDÞPðLjDÞ: ð12Þ
On this basis we can build a network, with the variables F, L and D as nodes. The
probability function determined by factor analysis can thus be represented in a
Bayesian network whose graph is depicted in Fig. 1.
There are also differences between the theory of Bayesian networks and that of
latent variable models. For one, the latter entails a rather specific network structure:
there are hidden parent nodes, observable child nodes, there are typically fewer
parents than children, and any child can be connected to any parent. On the other
hand, applications of the former are usually restricted to probability functions over
finite or at least countable domains. Nodes with continuous domains are not that
commonly discussed, although they have been studied in the context of structural
equation models, for example by Pearl (2000), and, from the side of latent variable
modeling, by von Eye and Clogg (1994). A related difference is that in most
applications of factor analysis, the probability functions that are considered are
restricted to normal distributions over latent nodes, and to linear regressions with
normal errors between latent and observable nodes. Applications of Bayesian
networks are typically, but not necessarily, restricted to Bernoulli distributions.
In this section we approach latent variable modelling from the angle of Bayesian
networks, using the framework for inference over Bayesian networks presented in




Fig. 1 The graphical structure
representing the independence
relations in a factor analysis of
depression, fear and loathing
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Sect. 2.3 is framed as a problem to do with determining the posterior probability
distribution over the parameters that characterize the Bayesian network of Fig. 1.
The aim is to resolve this statistical underdetermination by means of intervention
data. In order to do this, we first introduce interventions in the context of Bayesian
networks.
4.2 Interventions
A causally interpreted Bayesian network, or causal net for short, is a Bayesian
network where the graph is interpreted as a causal graph. That is, each arrow in the
graph is interpreted as denoting a direct causal relationship from the parent variable
to the child variable. Under this interpretation, the Markov Condition is called the
Causal Markov Condition. It says that each variable is probabilistically independent
of its non-effects conditional on its direct causes. It is often assumed that the Causal
Markov Condition is bound to hold if the graph in the net is correct and is closed
under common causes (i.e., any common causes of variables in the net are also
included in the net). While there are situations in which the Causal Markov
Condition is implausible, it can nevertheless be justified as a default assumption
(Williamson 2005), and we shall take it for granted here.
Causal nets are helpful for predicting the effects of interventions. When an
experimenter intervenes to fix the value of a target variable, she interrupts the
normal course of affairs and sets the variable exogenously. The usual mechanisms
by which the target variable is determined are thereby replaced by new mechanisms;
these new mechanisms allow the experimenter to fix a value of the variable. An
‘ideal’ or ‘divine’ intervention is one in which the intervention only changes the
intended target variable, without changing other variables under consideration and
without changing other causal relationships under consideration. By means of
Eq. (10) we can determine the probability P0 that some variable F takes value 0 after
an ideal intervention has been performed that sets D to 1, say. Note that the causal
net determines two different probability distributions, P before and P0 after
intervention. While P and P0 will coincide in the probability assignments to non-
descendants of D, and also in the probability assignments conditional on D, the
unconditional probabilities for the variables downstream from D will be different.
Not all interventions are ideal. Other forms of intervention are ham-fisted in that
they change the values of several variables at once, or non-modular in that they
change other causal relationships, or parametric in the sense that they change the
conditional probability distribution of the target variable without deterministically
fixing its value. One subspecies of parametric intervention, which we shall refer to
as a stochastic intervention, is central to our concerns: an intervention in which one
sets the probability of the target variable to a new value P0ðD ¼ 1Þ ¼ d0 while
leaving the rest of the network intact. In other words, the causal net is transformed
by eliminating arrows into the target D, setting its unconditional distribution to
P0ðD ¼ 1Þ ¼ d0, and then determining the new probabilities for other variables.9
9 See Korb et al. (2004) and Eberhardt and Scheines (2007) for further discussion of kinds of
intervention.
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Generally, interventions can help with identifiability problems in two ways. First,
they can help with the identifiability of causal effects, as alluded to at the start of
this paper. If more than one causal structure is compatible with evidence or if the
specific relation between two variables is not known, then one can intervene, collect
more evidence, and use this new evidence to decide over the matter. To take the
example presented in the foregoing, suppose variables F, L and D are all measured,
and that the resulting data shows that F and L are probabilistically independent
conditional on D, written F ⊥ L | D. This evidence is compatible with the causal
graph of Fig. 1, but equally with Figs. 2 and 3. The evidence can be used to fill in
the conditional probability distributions on these causal models, but cannot decide
between them. An intervention can decide between them, however. If, after
intervening to change the distribution of D, the distribution of F and L are changed,
then that favours Fig. 1. Otherwise if only the distribution of L is changed after
intervention, then Fig. 2 is supported, and if only the distribution of F is changed
then Fig. 3 is supported.
By contrast, the point of this paper is that interventions can be used to make a
statistical model with a given causal structure identifiable. Suppose that the causal
structure is known and that data is collected which helps to estimate the probability
distributions of some variables conditional on their parents, but which does not
determine conditional distributions that attach to other variables. By carrying out an
intervention, an experimenter changes the conditional distribution of one variable
without changing the distributions of other variables. The data obtained after the
intervention can then be used in conjunction with the old data to further constrain
the values of the underdetermined distributions.
4.3 Interventions and Model Identifiability
In this section we show how interventions, in a wide reading of this term, can be
used to resolve the statistical identifiability problem for latent class models,
introduced in Sect. 2.3 with the example on depression, fear, and loathing.
Let us briefly explain the general idea. We need to assume that the latent variable
model is more than a convenient way of representing the probability functions
involved. The arrows in the model need to be interpreted causally, that is, the latent
variables must be taken as the causes of the observed variables. With this causal
assumption in place, an intervention on the subjects will indeed change the
distribution over the latent variables of the subjects. Importantly, in the application
F D L
Fig. 2 A chain of fear F causing depression D, which causes loathing L
L D F
Fig. 3 A chain of loathing L causing depression D, which causes fear F
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of interventions that we are currently considering it is not required that we have
detailed knowledge of how the intervention has influenced the target variable, as
long as we know that this change is not an effect of other variables in the model.
Note, in particular, that a stochastic intervention is taken to be modular: the
probabilistic relations between the latent and the manifest variables does not change
as a result of the intervention. As explained in the foregoing, after an intervention
we obtain an entirely new estimation problem for the parameters in the Bayesian
network. However, we assume that the parameters associated with the relations
between latent and manifest variables do not change: the values of /i and ki are not
affected. In the following we show that, depending on the model, the data obtained
after an intervention of this type can be used to select a unique best estimate for the
parameter values in the latent variable model.
Consider again the model characterized by Eqs. (2) to (4), (11) and (12). As
explained in the foregoing, an intervention is an exogenous change to the probability
assignment. In this particular case, some change is made to the node D, e.g., all the
subjects are given a treatment intended to change the probability for depression. We
thus change the probability of depression, PðDi ¼ 1Þ ¼ d, to a new value,
P0ðDi ¼ 1Þ ¼ d
0
;
which—we assume—is less than than d. The relation of the depression variable to
the variables of fear and loathing, given by P0ðFi ¼ 1jDi ¼ jÞ ¼ /j and
P0ðLi ¼ 1jDi ¼ jÞ ¼ kj, is not changed by the intervention: the treatment changes
the probability for depression but not how depression, whether absent or present,
affects feelings of fear and loathing.
It is important to stress that the intervention under consideration covers a wider
class than what is usually taken as an intervention in the literature of Bayesian
networks. We do not need to suppose that the details of the exogenous change to the
probability of depression is known but merely that it has particular qualitative
characteristics, e.g., that d0\d. Moreover, we need not even suppose that we only
target the depression variable D. Any ham-fisted intervention that makes an
exogenous change to other variables that are not causes of the observables under
consideration, in addition to the change on the latent variable under consideration, is
suitable as an intervention. This means that the solution of the statistical
identifiability problem considered here may also work in the context of a so-called
‘natural experiment’.
After the intervention, or exogenous change to the system, we record the
observations S0t in the same set of t individuals. By analogy to Eq. (6), we observe






FiLi; . . .:
So r0jk are the relative frequencies of the variables F and L as observed after the
intervention. They present three further constraints on the parameters of the latent
variable model.
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To get the point across quickly, we focus again on the dimensions of the model.
This time we count a number of 6 parameters, namely d, /j and kj for j ¼ 0; 1, and
finally d0. On the other hand, we have a richer set of observations that can be used to





i before intervention, and 3 of them after intervention, so 6 in total. Whereas
previously we had two degrees of freedom left after the incorporation of the data,
we can now fill in all the parameter values of the factor model.
Let us make this more precise. As before, we have the likelihoods of Eqs. (5).
But to these expressions we now add the likelihoods of the hypotheses after the
intervention:
P0ðFi ¼ 0; Li ¼ 1jHhÞ ¼ h
0
01 ¼ d
0ð1 /1Þk1 þ ð1 d
0Þð1 /0Þk0;
P0ðFi ¼ 1; Li ¼ 0jHhÞ ¼ h
0
10 ¼ d
0/1ð1 k1Þ þ ð1 d
0Þ/0ð1 k0Þ;
P0ðFi ¼ 1; Li ¼ 1jHhÞ ¼ h
0
11 ¼ d
0/1k1 þ ð1 d
0Þ/0k0:
ð13Þ
The system of equations that results from equating likelihoods and observed relative
frequencies before and after intervention is





for all j and k. Each of these constrains the parameters in h and h0 in a particular
way.
The ‘‘Appendix’’ to this paper shows that if this system of equations has a
solution, then the solution is unique up to a transformation of the two values for D.
Solutions thus come in mirror-image pairs, differing in the interpretation of the
values for the variable D or, in other words, differing in whether the intervention has
beneficial or adverse effects on the probability of being depressed. On the
assumption that the treatment reduces the probability for depression, every
hypothesis Hh in the model is associated with a unique set of values for the
likelihoods hjk and h
0
jk. The conclusion is that if the data are generated by a chance
process specified by a hypothesis Hh, then we can identify this hypothesis, in the
same way as we were able to identify the true Hh in the model of Eq. (1).
Note that this does not hold for the entire range of possible values for the
observed frequencies. For extremal values there is still an infinity of solutions.
Moreover, certain combinations of frequencies simply do not match with any of the
statistical hypotheses within the model. In those cases the intervention data
overdetermine the latent variable model, i.e., it fails to fit all the correlations. We
must then look for a richer statistical model. It would be rather natural to incorporate
this aspect of scientific reasoning into our account, by describing how statistical
models are adapted when intervention data yield a bad fit. The idea is that the
overdetermination due to intervention may lead to controlled and formally specified
changes in the model, and that this may lead to a formal account of theory change.
However, such an account is beyond the scope of the current paper.
The main conclusion for now is that intervention data can indeed be used to
resolve the identifiability problem introduced in Sect. 2.1. If there are parameter
values matching the relative frequencies exactly, then on the assumption that the
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treatment is beneficial, these values are unique: the likelihood function has a unique
maximum after the normal and the intervention data are incorporated. While we
have only shown this for a simple example, it is readily seen, and briefly considered
in the ‘‘Appendix’’, that the example generalizes. The example serves as a proof of
principle and supports the central idea of this paper, which is that interventions can
help to resolve statistical identifiability problems.
5 Philosophical and Practical Implications
We now discuss the philosophical and practical implications of the approach of this
paper. After that we briefly revisit the indeterminacy of factor scores and suggest
how intervention data can be used to resolve this indeterminacy, at least in the form
it takes within a Bayesian statistical model.
5.1 Interventions Replace Theoretical Criteria
Our paper suggests a novel way to use intervention data, namely to resolve
statistical identifiability problems. Where we had otherwise to use a theoretical
criterion to choose among the equally well fitting alternative hypotheses, we can
now make this choice on the basis of additional data, obtained after intervention.
One might say that within statistics the identifiability problem has fuzzy edges: it
can be resolved by an appeal to theoretical criteria, as routinely done for the rotation
problem in factor analysis, but it can also be resolved by extending the realm of
observations to include intervention data.
It is worth reiterating that we do not need to know anything about the exact
impact of the intervention. That is, we do not need to know the exact value of d0. It
suffices that we have changed the probability of the latent variable. Clearly, this is
not to say that the use of intervention data requires no assumptions whatsoever. As
indicated in the foregoing, the new data can only be taken as pertaining to the same
parameters if we assume that the causal structure of the latent and observed
variables is, at least roughly, correct. More specifically, we need to assume that the
probabilistic relations between the latent and the observed variables, expressed in /i
and ki, remain invariant under intervention. So in order to employ the intervention
data for a resolution of the identifiability problem, we have to make particular causal
assumptions. In a sense these modeling assumptions help us to get more out of the
data than would otherwise be possible.10
We think that this resolution by causal assumptions and further empirical data is
preferable to a resolution that employs a theoretical criterion only. This may be
interesting for philosophers concerned with the interplay between theory and
empirical fact in confirmation relations. Additionally, the result may help to put
latent variable modelling on a firmer footing—in particular factor analysis, which
has long been regarded by some as somewhat speculative (Furfey and Daly 1937).
Finally, the use of interventions to resolve identifiability problems in factor analysis
10 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this formulation to us.
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may be of practical interest. The rotation problem is a live one for designers of
clinical and personality tests: how do we relate clusters of test items to specific
personality traits? And what traits should we distinguish in the first place? Our
suggestion would be that intervention data may help constrain the latent structure
behind psychometric tests, thereby providing a clearer view of what the tests are
measuring.11
5.2 Interventions and the Indeterminacy of Factor Scores
We briefly remark on the problem of the indeterminacy of factor scores, as
discussed in Sect. 3.2. Insofar as there is a problem with factor scores in the
Bayesian treatment, intervention data can play an interesting role.
Recall that the expected value E½h, given in Eq. (7), depends on the posterior
probability over the parameter PðHhjStÞ, and that this posterior depends on the prior
probability PðHhÞ. As shown by Bartholomew and Knott (1999), the indeterminacy
of factor scores in classical factor analysis derives directly from the fact that a prior
probability is not provided. And because in a Bayesian treatment such a prior is
assumed, we can say that Bayesian factor analysis is not affected by factor score
indeterminacy. However, the prior is assumed, not derived, so a classical statistician
may well ask for a motivation of the prior probability assignment.
Following the ideas set out above, the prior probability may be determined by
means of intervention data. Instead of choosing a single prior, we might consider a
range of priors over the parameter values, labeled by q say. We thereby increase the
dimension of the parameter space by one. But we might know from a different study
that the chance of being depressed after the treatment d0 has some particular value,
or is functionally related to the chance on depression before treatment. This reduces
the number of parameters by one again, because d0 is then fixed, or every d0 is
coupled to a unique value d. The net effect is that we can again estimate all the
parameters, namely d, /j and kj for j ¼ 0; 1, and finally the second-order parameter
q.12
In other words, just as we can estimate the effects of an intervention, d0, we can
estimate the prior probability assignment that best suits the factor model. Of course,
this is just a simple example. We have not said anything about the more realistic
continuous case, in which we typically assume a normal distribution over the
continuous variable Di as prior. Moreover, it is unrealistic to suppose that there is a
clear and deterministic relation between the parameters governing the distribution
11 It is a topic of ongoing debate whether latent variables have to be taken as real in some sense (cf.
Borsboom et al. 2003). This debate is relevant to our concerns, but not sufficiently to motivate an indepth
discussion here. We need not adopt a realist or an instrumentalist view on latent variables to appreciate
the point that theoretical criteria, formulated in terms of such latents, can be replaced by causal
assumptions and intervention data. Similarly, the insightful discussion in Weinberger (2015) on latents
and ideal interventions is relevant but not crucial: our points do not hinge on the interventions on latents
being ideal.
12 In the statistical literature, the idea that we can confirm or disconfirm probability distributions over
statistical parameters has become known as hierarchical Bayesian modelling. See, for instance, Chapter 5
of Gelman et al. (2013), and the philosophical appraisals in Henderson et al. (2010) and Romeijn (2013).
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over the variables Di before and after the intervention. Nevertheless, we suggest that
the analysis presented here illuminates how intervention data can be of use in
dealing with the rightful heir of the problem of factor score indeterminacy in
Bayesian factor analysis, namely the problem of how to choose a prior.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the use of interventions for the problem of statistical
identifiability: if two hypotheses have exactly the same likelihoods for all the possible
observations, then how do we choose between them? While an answer to this question
often invokes theoretical criteria such as simplicity and explanatory considerations, we
have provided a partial answer in terms of empirical criteria. The idea is to use the
background theory that generates the hypotheses, namely the causal structure. This
theory provides us with a recipe for how to deal with interventions. Together with
some assumptions on the causal structure of the latent and observed variables, the
intervention data enable us to tell the statistically equivalent hypotheses apart.
We illustrated the identifiability problem by means of a latent class model. That
is, we showed how interventions can be framed in terms of alterations to such a
model, and how the intervention data can then be employed. In this paper we have
not developed the same ideas for the more practical setting of factor analysis with
normal distributions over continuous variables. But we believe that the problems
identified in discrete Bayesian networks is in all the relevant respects similar to the
rotation problem in the continuous setting, and we suggest that future work can
resolve this problem of rotation by appealing to intervention data. On the other hand
we realize that there is still a long way to go from the theoretical considerations in
this work to the practical concerns of psychometricians.13
We will mention one specific theme for future research. We suggested that,
relative to a given causal structure that links latent and observable variables,
intervention data can also guide extensions of the statistical model. The rough idea
is that the specifics of the misfit between model and intervention data will suggest
how the latent structure might be adapted to repair the fit. Model selection
techniques and further considerations of complexity or conservativity might then
determine which of these adaptations is most appropriate. The methods and
algorithms for putting this idea to work have yet to be determined, but we think that
there are many potential applications of the idea. A tool for guiding extensions of
statistical models can be of use to experimental scientists, but also to computer
scientists working on the automated search of network structures.
Such applications lie within the realm of statistical methodology. However, there
may be a further application of these ideas within the philosophy of science. The
13 In many cases psychometricians will have more pressing concerns than the exact identifiability of the
parameters. See, for example, Hayduk and Littvay (2012), who argue that it is often preferable to accept
some uncertainty in the determination of the model. In their view it is better to use the few best indicators,
and direct further observation efforts towards developing more sophisticated theoretical models, so as to
bring mediating and confounding variables into view. However, this does not take away from our point
that intervention data may be highly informative.
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confirmatory practice of scientists has received a lot of attention from formally
oriented philosophers of science, often with the aim of explaining or rationalizing
science, or of providing scientists with norms that guide the inference from data to
theory. Experimental practice, on the other hand, has not been subject to the same
scrutiny by formal modelers. It has been the subject of science and technology
studies, but not of formal philosophy of science. We believe formal philosophy of
science will have interesting things to say about experimentation because the tools
to describe interventions in mathematical terms are available. We hope that with the
present study, we are contributing to the development of such a formal philosophy
of experiment.
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Appendix
This appendix substantiates the claim that if the system of Eqs. (14) has a solution,
then this solution is unique. We are only dealing with the specific example of this
paper and do not generalize the result. The generalization will bring rather
cumbersome algebraic expressions and, we believe, little added insight. The reader
may glean the strategy for an analytical investigation of the solution space, and an
associated proof strategy for the general case, from what follows.14
We first combine the expressions of Eqs. (5) and (13) to obtain
h10 þ h11 ¼ d/1 þ ð1 dÞ/0  f ;
















where f ¼ r10 þ r11 and l ¼ r01 þ r11 are the frequencies of fear and loathing
observed before intervention, and f 0 and l0 are those frequencies after intervention.
We can now solve for d as well as d0 by combining Eqs. (15), thus deriving the first
four constraints on the parameters:
14 With the aid of the solver in Mathematica, we have also investigated this space numerically. Special
thanks go to David Atkinson for providing help with this, and for initially presenting us with an
alternative, more elegant proof of uniqueness.

















The intuitive meaning is that f and f 0 must both sit in between /0 and /1, as
determined by d and d0, and that the relative positions of f and f 0 within this interval
must be matched by the relative positions of l and l0 in between k0 and k1. In terms
of freedom in the parameter space, there are thus two degrees of freedom left. If, for
example, we fix /0 and /1 by hand, the values for k0 and k1 as well as the values for
d and d0 follow.
We now determine these two constraints by a further set of two equations.
Consider the expressions for fear and loathing occurring together:
h11 ¼ d/1k1 þ ð1 dÞ/0k0  c; ð17Þ
h011 ¼ d




We abbreviate the frequencies of them occurring together as c and c0. We can now
substitute terms appearing in Eqs. (15) into Eq. (17). With some reformulation these
substitutions lead to
k0/1 ¼ fk0 þ l/1  c; ð19Þ
k1/0 ¼ fk1 þ l/0  c: ð20Þ
We can derive the analogous expressions for the parameters by using the frequency
after intervention c0, now substituting terms from Eqs. (15) into Eq. (18). Com-
bining Eqs. (19) and (20) with the analogous expressions involving c0, we obtain
k0 ¼
l0  l
f  f 0
/1 
c0  c




f  f 0
/0 
c0  c
f  f 0
: ð22Þ
Together with the constraints of Eq. (16) these two linear relations between the k’s
and /’s are sufficient for determining all the values of the parameters.
To solve the equations we fill in the expression for k0 of Eq. (21) into Eq. (19),
thereby obtaining a quadratic equation for /1:
l0  l
f  f 0
/1 
c0  c




f  f 0
/1 
c0  c
f  f 0
 
þ l/1  b:
A parallel expression for /0 can be obtained by filling in k1 of Eq. (22) into
Eq. (20), but if soluble within the domain [0, 1], this expression will yield the same
two solutions. Once we choose either of the two solutions for /1, the parameter /0
takes on the other value. And once we have solved for /1 and chosen whether it
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obtains the higher or the lower of the two values, we thereby fix the values of all the
other parameters. Swapping around the two solutions will effectively swap around
the ordering among d and d0, according to the expressions above.
With respect to the interpretation of depression, fear, loathing, and treatment, the
normal case will have f 0\f , l0\l and c0\c so that k0\k1, /0\/1, and d
0
\d. A
further investigation of the space of solutions can be undertaken by identifying of
each point in the space of frequencies whether or not the constraints can all be met.
However, for present purposes the abstract characterization suffices, alongside the
remark that the space of solutions is non-empty.
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